Bagian Seri politik
Sistem pemilihan
Pluralitas/mayoritas Pluralitas Pemenang undi terbanyak Suara tunggal yang tidak dapat dialihkan Pemilihan terbatas Kemajemukan besar (pemilihan blok) Tiket umum Sistem banyak putaran Dua putaran Surat suara lengkap Sistem peringkat / preferensial Putaran instan (pemilihan alternatif) Pilih kontingen Metode Coombs Metode Condorcet (Copeland, Dodgson, Kemeny–Young, Minimax, Nanson, Pasangan berperingkat, Schulze, Alternatif Smith) Sistem posisional (Hitung Borda, Metode Nauru/Dowdall, Eurovision Song Contest) Pemilihan Bucklin Sistem pemilihan awal Oklahoma Pemilihan blok preferensial Sistem kardinal / kelas Pemilihan nilai Pemilihan persetujuan (unified primary) Pemilihan persetujuan kombinasi Pertimbangan biasa Satisfaction approval voting Pertimbangan mayoritas STAR voting
Perwakilan berimbang Daftar partai (Daftar terbuka, Daftar tertutup, Daftar lokal) Rata-rata tertinggi (D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Huntington–Hill) Sisa terbesar (Hare, Droop, Imperiali, Hagenbach-Bischoff) Daftar peringkat partai PB Suara spare Bentuk berimbang dari pemilihan peringkat Suara tunggal yang dapat dialihkan (Gregory, Wright, CPO-STV, Schulze STV) Bentuk berimbang dari pemilihan persetujuan Pemilihan persetujuan berimbang Pemilihan persetujuan berurutan Pembagian biproporsional Pemilihan mayoritas adil Pemilihan tertimbang Perwakilan langsung Perwakilan Interaktif Demokrasi cairan
Sistem campuran Berimbang anggota campuran Sistem penambahan anggota Pemilihan paralel (mayoritas anggota campuran) Scorporo Mayoritas bonus Pemilihan alternatif plus Perwakilan anggota ganda Perwakilan desa–kota
Sistem lain dan teori berhubungan Pemilihan kumulatif Pemilihan binomial Pemilihan wakil Pemilihan delegasi Seleksi acak (Undian, Surat suara acak) Perbandingan sistem pemilihan Teori pilihan sosial Arrow's theorem Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem Teori pilihan publik
Portal Politik
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Pilihan publik, atau teori pilihan publik, adalah "penggunaan alat ekonomi untuk menangani masalah tradisional dalam ilmu politik".^[1] Isinya meliputi kajian perilaku politik. Dalam ilmu politik, itu adalah bagian dari teori politik positif yang mempelajari kepentingan diri agen (pemilih, politikus, birokrat) dan interaksi mereka, yang dapat diwakili dalam sejumlah cara – menggunakan (misalnya) pemaksimalan utilitas terkendala standar, teori permainan, atau teori keputusan.^[1] Ini adalah asal dan landasan intelektual kerja kontemporer dalam ekonomi politik.^[2]

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• Ostrom, Vincent (1986). The Theory of the Compound Republic. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. Second edition.
• Palda, Filip (2016). A Better Kind of Violence: The Chicago School of Political Economy, Public Choice, and The Quest for an Ultimate Theory of Power. Cooper-Wolfling Press.
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